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four petemptory challenges and are entitled to a greater number of
peremptory challenges than is the state, even in non-capital cases. J.
Van Dyke, Jury Selection Procedures, 282-3 (Ballinger 1977). Thus,
a request that the court grant additional challenges is not a novel idea,
but is merely a request to employ a practice already recognized in
many courts as necessary to protect the right of a defendant to a fair
trial, even in non-capital cases.
MOTION TO PROHIBIT THE IMPOSITION
OF THE DEATH PENALTY
The motion to prohibit the imposition of the death penalty, and
its supporting memorandum of authority drafted by Virginia Capital
Case Clearinghouse, includes five sections. These five sections point
out flaws in the application of Virginia's death penalty statute and
together make the argument that Virginia's statute is unconstitutional.
The first section argues that both the "future dangerousness"
and "vileness" aggravating factors fail to guide the jury's discretion
as required by Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S. Ct. 2726, 33
L. Ed. 2d 346 (1972); Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 100 S. Ct.
1759, 64 L. Ed. 2d 398 (1980); Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U. S.
356, 108 S. Ct. 1853, 100 L. Ed. 2d 372 (1988). The vileness
predicate must be sufficiently narrowed to guide the jury's discretion
in order to be constitutional. Virginia's vileness predicate on its face
and as applied fails to guide the jury's discretion to prevent the
arbitrary and capricious infliction of the death penalty.
Section two argues that the imposition of the death penalty
based on the aggravating factor of "future dangerousness" is
unconstitutional because the use of prior conviction evidence violates
the defendant's 5th and 14th Amendments right not to be placed
twice in jeopardy. It urges that, by allowing the jury to use the
evidence of prior convictions to impose the sentencing of death, the
defendant has been given multiple punishments for the same offense.
The third section states that the execution of a sentence of
death constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in contravention of
the Eighth Amendment. This argument is based on the contention
that society's standards of decency have evolved to the point that
execution can no longer be tolerated. Thirteen states have declined to
reinstate the death penalty. Other states have death penalty statutes
but no death sentences. Still other states have death sentences but no
executions. It is argued that these facts demonstrate a national
consensus that executions are not necessary or acceptable to serve the
retributive interests of society.
Section four first argues that Virginia courts practice of failing
adequately to instruct on mitigation, and the use of incomplete and
misleading instructions and forms violates constitutional commands
in along line of cases starting with Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586
(1978), by creating an impermissible risk that a death sentence will
be imposed despite mitigating factors justifying a sentence less than
death.
Section five argues that Virginia's lack of meaningful
appellate review of death sentence cases violates Fourteenth
Amendment due process. Virginia provides for review of death
sentences by the Virginia Supreme Court. Va. Code Ann § 17-110.1
(1988). The Virginia statutory scheme does not, however, provide for
meaningful appellate review.
The Virginia statutory scheme does not require the trial judge
or jury to specify the findings that justified an imposition of a death
sentence. Without documentation of the reasons supporting a
sentence of death, the Virginia Supreme Court cannot conduct a
meaningful appellate review of the imposition of the death penalty.
Further, there is no review of life sentences where there is no appeal.
A statutory scheme that fails to provide for meaningful appellate
review violates a defendant's Eighth Amendment right against cruel
and unusual punishment. Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 104 S. Ct.
871, 79 L. Ed. 2d 29 (1984).
This motion should be filed pretrial, as it raises systemic
constitutional issues about the application of Virginia's death penalty.
However, whether a questionable procedure will actually be
employed in a given trial will not be known until the appropriate time
in the trial. For example, one cannot be sure that the objectional
standard jury instruction will be given or the improper evidence
offered to support future dangerousness until witnesses are proffered
and instructions given at the penalty phase. Consequently, the motion
should be renewed at the time the violation allegedly occurs. See
Hoke v. Commonwealth, 237 Va. 303, 377 S.E.2d 595 (1989)
(defense counsel determined to have waived objection to venue by
failing to renew motion).
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In Virginia, the capital statutory scheme purports to narrow the
class of death eligible persons by enumerating certain circumstances
under which a homicide becomes capital murder. In order to sustain a
capital conviction under § 18.2-3 1, the Commonwealth must prove
beyond a reasonable doubt (1) a willful, deliberate, premeditated
killing in addition to one of the four enumerated first degree felonies
(abduction with intent to extort money or pecuniary benefit, abduc-
tion with intent to defile, robbery and rape), or (2) a willful, deliber-
ate, premeditated murder in one of four other contexts (killing for
hire, killing by a prisoner, killing of a law enforcement officer, killing
of more than one person as part of the same transaction). Va. Code
Ann. § 18.31 (1-8).
Unlike the statutory schemes in other states, the Virginia
statute does not require the Commonwealth to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt one particularly aggravated murder. The North
Carolina capital murder statute, for example, requires the prosecution
prove only first degree murder to sustain a capital conviction. By
contrast, in prosecutions under one of the four felony sections, the
Virginia statute requires the Commonwealth to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt two felonious activities, each with independent
elements. Each of the felonies that can "elevate" premeditated first
degree murder to capital murder is a separate crime that may be
prosecuted where there is no homicide. Consequently, Virginia court;
have the opportunity to construe the elements of robbery, rape, and
abduction in both capital and non-capital contexts. This article
analyzes the variations in construction of the reach of these enumer-
ated offenses. The capital statute now includes as predicate offenses
the felonies of attempted robbery and attempted rape. At present, no
capital convictions have been based on attempt. Analysis of possible
capital versus non-capital construction of attempt is beyond the scope
of this article.
(a) Robbery as a predicate offense:
The offense of robbery has a definition which is more broadly
construed by the Supreme Court of Virginia when robbery is used as
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the predicate offense to a capital charge in Virginia Code § 18.2-
31(4), than when it is charged independently under § 18.2-58. The
judicial construction of the offense of abduction is also broad.
However, abduction is applied more narrowly when used as the
capital predicate as a result of limits present in the statutory language
and not because of judicial construction.
A willful, deliberate and premeditated killing of "any person in
the commission of robbery or attempted robbery while armed with a
deadly weapon" constitutes an offense of capital murder under Code
§ 182-31(4).
The elements of robbery in Virginia include 1) a taking 2) with
intent to steal and 3) violence or intimidation, which precedes or is
contemporaneous with the taking. Branch v. Commonwealth, 225 Va.
91,300 S.E.2d 758 (1983). Robbery is not specifically defined by
statute in Virginia and the definition of robbery is found in the
common law. Johnson v. Commonwealth, 209 Va. 291,163 S.E.2d
570 (1968). In Virginia robbery is a crime against the person, for
which a punishment is prescribed by statute in § 18.2-58. The
elements of common law robbery are the 1) use or threat of violence
against the victim and 2) the theft of property from the victim's
person or in his presence. Harris v. Commonwealth, 3 Va. App. 519,
521, 351 S.E.2d 356, 356 (1986). Proof of robbery is complete when
the Commonwealth proves the taking, the intent to steal, the presence
of the victim, the force or intimidation overbearing the victim's will,
and that the victim's possessory rights in the property are superior to
those of the thief. Hairston v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. App. 211, 217,
343 S.E.2d 355, 361 (1986) (court affirming defendant's conviction
for robbery).
A taking includes two elements, asportation and caption. R.
Groot, Criminal Offenses and Defenses in Va. at 272 (2d ed. 1988).
Caption occurs when the accused takes control over the property and
asportation occurs when the accused moves the property. Almost any
movement will suffice for a "taking." Id.
In Branch, a non-capital case, a second degree murder
conviction was affirmed and a robbery conviction was reversed.
Because the defendant had no intent to steal at the time he shot his
victim, the evidence was found to be insufficient as a matter of law to
support a conviction for robbery. Id. at 92. In other words, the offense
is not robbery unless the intent to steal, or "animus furandi," is
"conceived before or at the time the violence was committed." Id. at
93. The court recognized two factors in determining that the
defendant possessed no intent to steal: that the defendant had offered
the victim money immediately prior to the killing and that the taking
of the victim's wallet revealed no purpose other than to cover up the
defendant's crime by destroying the victim's identification
documents Id. at 95.
In contrast, in Whitley v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. 66, 286
S.E.2d 162 (1982), the court affirmed the defendant's death sentence
for conviction of capital murder during a robbery while armed with a
deadly weapon. The court held that it is "immaterial that the victim is
dead when the theft occurs." Id. at 73.
In Branch as in Whitley, the victim was dead when the caption
and asportation occurred. But in Whitley, the court found the
defendant killed his victim with the intent to rob him. Id. at 74. In
Branch, however, the evidence revealed that the intent to steal did not
surface before or during the killing, but after the killing.
The killing may occur before, during, or after the taking in
capital felony-murder cases where robbery is used as the predicate
offense. See Harward v. Commonwealth, 229 Va. 363, 330 S.E.2d 89
(1985) (dicta indicating that "in the commission of" includes a killing
"before, during, and after" the felony).
In Mason v. Commonwealth, 200 Va. 253, 254-255, 105
S.E.2d 149, 150-151 (1958), another non-capital case, the defendant
broke the window of the victim's store, entered and took a television
and handed it through the window to a confederate. The shopkeeper
sneaked up on the defendant and hit him with a board and the
defendant then shot four times at the victim and fled. Id. The court
held that the crime was not robbery because the taking was complete
before the use of violence or intimidation toward the victim and these
elements must precede or occur at the time of the taking. Id.
In Pope v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 114, 360 S.E.2d 352
(1987), a capital case, the defendant demanded money of two women
who were sitting in a car, in which the defendant had been riding, and
shot the women before they could respond. The defendant contended
that the evidence did not eliminate two reasonable theories of
innocence: (1) that some person other than the defendant entered the
car and took the deceased's purse while the other woman went for
help after she drove to the hospital and (2) that the defendant took the
purse before he shot the women, so that the underlying offense would
be the lesser offense of larceny, not robbery, consistent with the
rationale of Mason. Id. at 124 (emphasis added). The court held that
the jury could conclude that the notion that a stranger stole the purse
during that time the woman went for help, which was estimated at
less than 30 seconds, was not reasonable or persuasive. Id. at 125.
More important to our analysis, the court also upheld the trial court's
ruling that the taking of the purse, the killing of its owner and the
wounding of the only person who could resist the taking, were "so
closely related in time, place, and causal connection as to constitute a
common criminal enterprise as a matter of law." Id. As a result, the
court held that the predicates for capital murder under § 18.2-31 (d)
(now § 18.2-31(4)) were established. Id.
Pope might be distinguished from Mason if Pope's taking was
not complete at the time he threatened to kill his victim. The
defendant in Mason had presumably "completed" the taking before
he used the force against his victim (he handed the goods to his
confederate, fired the shots at the victim, and then fled). Nevertheless
in Pope, the capital case, robbery was found via the "close relation-
ship" and "common criminal enterprise" language. Virginia's current
capital murder statute was not in effect at the time of Mason. The
elements of robbery, however, were ostensibly the same in both
cases. The argument could be made that, had Mason killed his victim,
the killing and the taking would be sufficiently "related" to support a
charge of § 18.2-31(4) capital murder.
It is not necessary for an intent to commit robbery to continue
for any length of time. Durham v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 166, 169,
198 S.E.2d 603, 606 (1973). In Durham, the victim surprised the
thieves by entering the room they were in and so the defendants'
intention changed from commission of larceny to robbery as the
defendants sought to prevent the victim from interfering by killing
her. Id. The court held that the "putting in fear" and violence
occurred at the time of the larceny and indicated an intent to commit
robbery. Id. at 169-170. As in Mason, the defendant exhibited an
intent to commit robbery at the time the violence was used against the
victim.
In Hoke v. Commonwealth, 237 Va. 303, 377 S.E.2d 595
(1989), another capital case, the Virginia Supreme Court reaffirmed
its commitment to the broader interpretation of "in the commission of
robbery." There the defendant bound, gagged and killed the victim
and stole some pills from her. The defendant said the victim "ripped
him off" and killed her because he "couldn't get his stuff back." Id. at
310. Because the killing and the robbery were so "closely related" as
part of a common criminal enterprise, the court then held that the
evidence supported the jury's conclusion that the defendant was
killed in the commission of a robbery while armed with a deadly
weapon. Id. at 311.
Threats of violence or harm to the body are not essential
aspects of intimidation; all that is required is that the victim be put in
fear of bodily harm by the deliberate conduct or words of the
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accused. Harris v. Commonwealth, 3 Va. App. 519, 521,351 S.E.2d
356, 358 (1986). In Harris, the victim, a juvenile, was stopped by
three men, tamed around by the defendant, who then searched the
victim and took his watch and radio. Id. at 521. The court held that
the jury could properly infer that the victim surrendered his property
as a result of his fear of harm caused by the defendant's intimidating
conduct. Id. In Virginia, there is no requirement that the victim's fear,
induced by the defendant's intimidating behavior, must be judged by
an objective standard of reasonableness. Id. at 522. Fear is evaluated
by a subjective standard. did the defendant's words or conduct
actually provoke fear in the victim? R. Groat, Criminal Offenses and
Defenses in Virginia at 75 (Supp. 1987).
In the non-capital setting, the Virginia court may narrowly
construe the common law elements of robbery as distinguished from
larceny. For example, the court will typically require that the "force"
element occur contemporaneously with the "taking" element. Where
robbery is the predicate offense for capital murder, however, the
court will broadly construe, or readily expand, the rather specific
common law elements of robbery. In the capital situations, the court
may more easily find the elements of robbery on weak circumstantial
evidence and resort to calling the killing and the taking so "closely
related" as to be part of the same "criminal enterprise," although
these elements may not have occurred simultaneously or contempora-
neously. The rationale for this distinction is not clear. It may be that
court's view that a premeditated killing, in the course of a taking, is
such an aggravated course of criminal conduct that the usual rule, that
criminal statutes be narrowly construed in favor of the accused,
should be abandoned.
(b) Rape as a predicate offense:
When a murder is committed "in the commission of, or
subsequent to a rape", assessment of the elements of rape is often
clouded by the fact of murder itself. Ostensibly, proof of rape as an
elevator of premeditated murder to capital murder in § 18.2-31(5) is
identical to that required to prove a violation of non-capital rape
under § 18.2-61(A). Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-31(5); § 18.2-61(A)..in
both instances, rape is defined as sexual intercourse against the
victim's will by force, threat, or intimidation. Va. Code Arm. § 18.2-
61(A). See also Hoke v. Commonwealth, 237 Va. 303, 310,377
S.E.2d 595,599 (1989); Sutton v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 654, 662,
324 S.E.2d 665, 669 (1985).
In a non-capital context, the force element may be established
by the uncorroborated testimony of the alleged victim. Poindexter v
Commonwealth, 213 Va. 212, 217, 191 S.E.2d 200, 204 (1972). On
appeal, a conviction based solely on the testimony of the victim will
be sustained unless the testimony of the victim is so inherently
unbelievable or so beyond human experience as to render it unworthy
of belief. Snyder v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 792, 796, 263 S.E.2d 55,
57-58 (1980). No positive resistance by the victim is necessary to
demonstrate that the intercourse was effected without consent. Jones
v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 983, 986, 252 S.E.2d 370,372 (1979). As
a result, the outcome of a non-capital rape case turns on the credibil-
ity of the prosecuting witness. Therefore, any physical and forensic
evidence presented by the Commonwealth serves only to corroborate,
to a greater or lesser degree, the credibility of the prosecuting
witness. The credibility of the victim and the weight to be given her
testimony are questions exclusively in the province of the jury.
Barker v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 370, 373, 337 S.E.2d 729, 732
(1985). The jury may either base its decision exclusively on the
victim's testimony or look beyond the victim's testimony to the
corroborative physical evidence. The jury ultimately decides whether
the act of intercourse was consensual or by force. Snyder, 263 S.E.2d
at 58.
Clearly, forcible intercourse is more easily established when
the victim is able to testify, or when the accused confesses. Tuggle v.
Commonwealth, 228 Va. 493,512,323 S.E.2d 539,549 (1984); Keil
v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 99, 105,278 S.E.2d 826, 830 (1981). The
killing of the victim and absence of confession, however, do not
preclude a finding of forced intercourse. Keil, 278 S.E.2d at 830; See
generally Justus v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 971, 979, 266 S.E.2d 87,
93 (1980); Waye v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 683, 251 S.E.2d 202,
cert. denied, 442 U.S. 924 (1979). Rape may be proved by circum-
stantial evidence alone. Tuggle, 323 S.E.2d at 549. The size, height,
weight, and physical condition of the victim are all relevant factors to
be considered by the jury in determining the amount of force that was
used by the defendant to accomplish the rape, and the resistance that
was offered by the victim, or that she was capable of offering. Justus,
266 S.E.2d at 93.
While circumstantial evidence of force is used simply to
corroborate or impeach the alleged victim's testimony in a non-
capital rape case, this evidence is the deciding factor in a capital case.
That is, in a rape-murder, the jury must draw inferences of force
directly from the physical and forensic evidence. Given that infer-
ences are drawn strictly from circumstantial evidence in a capital
case, the Commonwealth should logically be required to put on more
to prove the force element than in a non-capital case. However, case
law indicates that, to the contrary, little evidence is necessary to
procure a finding of force in a capital context.
On its face, the Virginia capital murder statute is narrowly
drawn. Virginia Code § 18.2-31(5) provides for capital punishment
when murder is committed "in the commission of, or subsequent to a
rape." Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-31(5). The statute requires two
independent findings; rape and premeditated murder. The offense
rendering the accused death eligible, therefore, is not satisfied unless
the Commonwealth first proves that sexual intercourse was procured
by force and without the victim's consent. Id.
While the force element may be inseparable from the force
necessary to effectuate the murder where the murder in fact occurs
literally "in the commission" of the rape, the more likely rape-murder
scenario would require an independent showing of force. This is
because a common scenario includes some temporal delay between
the sexual act and the murder. Defendants frequently testify that
consensual intercourse was followed by a homicide. Hoke, 377
S.E.2d at 598. Such delay between intercourse and the killing should
require the Commonwealth to establish force independent from that
required to effectuate the murder. Without the victim present to
testify, the element of force necessary to obtain a rape conviction
must be based on the totality of the facts and circumstances. Tuggle,
323 S.E.2d at 550; Justus, 266 S.E.2d at 93. Logically, the force
element of rape should become more difficult to prove in cases where
the murder in fact occurs "subsequent to" the rape. The Common-
wealth must show that prior to the murder, sexual intercourse was
procured by force and without the consent of the victim. Justus, 266
S.E. 2d at 93.
The fact that the Commonwealth has established penetration
and a subsequent murder should not automatically justify a convic-
tion of capital murder. The evidence may suggest that the killing
resulted from a quarrel in the heat of passion during or following a
consensual act. In Tuggle, the court stated that "when the Common-
wealth relies solely upon circumstantial evidence .., it is not
sufficient that the facts and circumstances proven are consistent with
the accused's guilt; they also must be inconsistent with every
reasonable hypothesis of his innocence." Tuggle 323 S.E.2d at 549;
Strawderman v. Commonwealth, 200 Va. 855, 858, 108 S.E.2d 376,
379 (1959). Nevertheless, the Tuggle court found the evidence
sufficient to establish force, asserting that "while the Common-
wealth's evidence must exclude all reasonable hypothesis of
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innocence, the hypotheses which must be excluded are those which
flow from the evidence itself, and not from the imagination of the
defense counsel." Tuggle, 323 S.E.2d at 550; Cookv. Common-
wealth, 226 Va. 427, 433, 309 S.E.2d 325, 329 (1983). In holding
that force was sufficient to establish rape, the court stated that
"Havens [the victim] was subject to a most brutal and heinous sexual
assault. The extensive bruises in the victim's body, the vicious bite
on her breast, the forcible anal sodomy, and the fatal gunshot wound
all attest to that." Tuggle 323 S.E.2d at 550. Had the court rested its
decision exclusively on the evidence of extensive bruising and the
bite on the breast, the decision would have been consistent with the
announced standard for evaluation of circumstantial evidence. This
would be true even considering the fact that the victim voluntarily
left a social gathering with the defendant. However, the court's
holding suggests that the force used to inflict the fatal wound may be
considered in establishing rape. Such reasoning is circular: 1) the
commonwealth must prove force to establish rape; 2) rape is essential
to a finding of capital murder; 3) force required to effectuate the
murder may indicate forceful sexual intercourse, rape.
The Virginia Supreme Court has sustained other capital
convictions based on weak evidence of forcible intercourse. In Justus
v. Commonwealth, the victim was killed, and the defendant never
admitted forcible intercourse. Justus, 266 S.E.2d at 89. The victim's
nude body revealed death resulted from a series of gunshot wounds to
the face and head. The victim in Justus was pregnant at the time she
was murdered. In finding force, the court held that:
The advanced state of pregnancy.., rendered remote
the possibility that the victim would have had inter-
course voluntarily with anyone, and a reasonable ex-
planation for the semen found in and on her body was
that it was the result of a rape committed during the
course of killing, an act (the killing) which Justus has
admitted.
Justus, 266 S.E.2d at 93. The opinion made no additional references
to physical or forensic evidence of force.
In Waye v. Commonwealth, the victim was murdered pursuant
to a brutal assault with a knife. Waye, 251 S.E.2d at 205. Though the
court found that penetration accompanied by injury to the victim's
breasts and buttocks was sufficient to establish force, the brutality of
the murder was undoubtedly a deciding factor in whether or not to
sustain the conviction. Id. at 209.
On appeal, the court will view the evidence and all reasonable
inferences in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, and the
jury's judgment will be affirmed unless plainly wrong or without
evidence to support it. Tuggle, 323 S.E.2d at 549. Yet, at the trial
level, it appears in a capital context that juries may be easily moved
by graphic depictions of violent murders, and that the requirement the
jury consider evidence of both homicide and rape may color its
evaluation of the rape evidence. Also, while the death of the
homicide victim potentially deprives the prosecution of direct
evidence of rape, it also deprives defense the opportunity for
impeachment of that evidence or of directly exculpatory testimony.
Since capital convictions are so rarely overturned by the Supreme
Court of Virginia, jury instructions should be proposed making it
clear that the force, however excessive, used to effectuate the killing
is not automatically sufficient proof of the force element required to
prove the crime of rape. More specifically, force used in the commis-
sion of the murder is not necessarily the same as that used to induce
sexual intercourse. Rather, intercourse may indeed be consensual.
A further instruction should require the juryfirst consider
whether defendant is guilty of rape. If the jury is unable to find the
defendant guilty of rape beyond a reasonable doubt, then the jury
must not even consider the offense of capital murder. Only upon an
affirmative finding of rape should the jury consider whether defen-
dant committed premeditated murder in the commission of or
subsequent to a rape.
The commission of a murder during or subsequent to the
independent felony of rape renders an accused death eligible. The
Commonwealth relies upon this restrictive statute to "buttress" the
constitutionality of the vague aggravating factors used thereafter to
support sentences of death. See Fakner, "'he Constitutional
Deficiencies of Virginia's "Vileness" Aggravating Factor", 2 Capital
Defense Digest 19 (Nov. 1989); Giarratano v. Procunier, 891 F.2d
483 (1989). The capital murder statute does less to meaningfully
narrow the class of death eligible defendants if it is interpreted to
permit findings of guilt upon proof of murder and sexual intercourse.
(c) Abduction with Intent to extort money for a pecuniary
benefit, or with the intent to defile as predicate offenses:
Section 18.2-47 of the Virginia Code sets out the elements of
the crime of abduction:
Any person, who, by force, intimidation or deception, and
without legal justification or excuse, seizes, takes,
transports, detains or secretes the person of another, with
the intent to deprive such other person of his personal
liberty or to withhold or conceal him from any person,
authority, or institution lawfully entitled to his charge, shall
be deemed guilty of 'abduction'. ..
Not only is this statute broadly drawn, it has been broadly
construed and, as will be seen from the cases noted below, abduction
may be found to accompany a host of other offenses.
The physical detention of a person by a person, with the intent
to deprive the former of his or her personal liberty, by force,
intimidation, or deception, without any asportation of the victim from
one place to another place, is sufficient to support a conviction for
abduction. Scott v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 519,526, 323 S.E.2d
572, 579 (1984).
Abduction under § 18.2-47 can occur by 1) acts aimed at the
victim of the abduction (the usual method of abduction) or 2) acts
aimed at the custodian of the victim of the abduction. Bennett v.
Commonwealth, 8 Va. App. 228, 380 S.E.2d 26 (1989) (court finding
defendants guilty of abduction as they acted without excuse or
justification and with the intent to conceal or withhold a child from
one lawfully entitled to the charge of the child). In essence, the
typical abduction occurs by 1) force, intimidation or deception and 2)
asportation or detention(and practically any detention will suffice)
(emphasis added). See generally, Scott at 526 (finding force or
intimidation element in defendant's testimony that he intended to
force his victim to remain where she was long enough to watch him
shoot himself); Diehl v. Commonwealth, - Va. App........, 385
S.E.2d 228, 231 (1989) (abduction charge sustained when evidence
revealed the defendant-parents shackled one of their children to a bus
for several weeks); Simms v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. App. 614, 617,
346 S.E.2d 734 (1986) (holding that abduction was established by
evidence showing the defendant-rapist had deprived his victim of
liberty by use of force and threats of violence); Coram v. Common-
wealth, 3 Va. App. 623, 352 S.E.2d 532 (1987) (holding that the
abduction was separate and apart from, and not just incidental to, the
crime of attempted rape, when the evidence revealed that the
defendant dragged his victim to an unlighted place, an asportation
which decreased the possibility of detection); Hawks v. Common-
wealth, 228 Va. 244,247,321 S.E.2d 650 (1984) (holding that
evidence of rape was relevant to the abduction charge and to the idea
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that he intended to deprive his victim of personal liberty); Barnett v.
Commonwealth, 216 Va. 200,202,217 S.E.2d 828 (1975) (holding
the intimidation or force element may be achieved by physical
violence or the threat of it: defendant threatened to shoot his victim if
she did not get in his car and she got in the car after believing she
heard the "click" of a gun); Brown v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 310,
314,337 S.E.2d 711 (1985) (holding that the initial detention,
through assaults and threats of violence, was different in time and
place, and in "quantity and quality the acts of force and intimidation
employed in the abduction were separate and apart from the restraint
inherent in the commission of rape"); Cf., Johnson v. Commonwealth,
221 Va. 872, 879, 275 S.E.2d 592 (1981) (holding a conviction for
abduction not supported by evidence that defendant broke into
victim's apartment and grabbed her and then fled, because he did this
in furtherance of sexual advances and he did not intend to deprive his
victim of her personal liberty, "although such a deprivation did occur
momentarily").
Like robbery in the capital context, § 18.2-47 abduction is
subject to broad judicial interpretation. As noted above, practically
any detention, no matter how slight, may constitute an abduction,
even without the element of asportation. Scott at 524. The legislature,
however, has provided that only a much narrower range of abduction
is applicable to capital cases.
A willful, deliberate and premeditated killing of "any person in
the commission of abduction, as defined in §18.2-48, when such
abduction was committed with the intent to extort money or a
pecuniary benefit" is an offense of capital murder under Virginia
Code § 18.2-31(1). Also, § 18.2-31(8) states that the
... willful, deliberate and premeditated killing of a child
under the age of twelve years in the commission of
abduction as defined in § 18.2-48 when such abduction
was committed with the intent to extort money or a
pecuniary benefit, or with the intent to defile the victim of
such abduction.
Section 18.2-48 abduction includes four aggravating elements
that elevate § 18.2-47 abduction to § 18.2-48 abduction: intent to
extort money, or pecuniary benefit, intent to defile, and female under
sixteen years of age for the purpose of concubinage or prostitution.
To elevate a homicide to capital murder under § 18.2-31(1)
and §18.2-31(8), there must have been a § 18.2-48 abduction. Thus
though basic abduction is broadly construed, the legislature has
identified only two situations where certain types of abduction will
support a capital charge under § 18.2-31(1) and three situations to
support a capital charge under § 18.2-31(8). In other words, the
statutory language of § 18.2-31 permits a capital murder charge only
when a willful, deliberate and premeditated killing has occurred in
the commission of some of the particular types of abduction set out in
§ 18.2-48.
Section 18.2-31(1) makes reference to extortion(for money or
a pecuniary benefit) as the only type of abduction that may support a
capital murder charge for the killing of "any person." The defendant
need not successfully extort, but he must at least intend to extort.
Section 18.2-31(8) includes all of the aggravators, except abduction
of a minor female for immoral purposes, to support a capital murder
charge for the killing of a child under twelve. Abduction, therefore, is
broadly construed in the non-capital context and the court typically
will find a force or intimidation element, no matter how slight, and a
detention, no matter how brief. When abduction is used as a capital
aggravator, abduction is defined more narrowly as the legislature has
mandated that only particular types of abduction will support capital
charges (the financial types under § 18.2-31(1) and the financial
types plus intent to defile under § 18.2-31(8).
There have been to date no capital murder prosecutions under
either § 18.2-31(1) or § 18.2-31(8). Consequently, it is unknown
whether the Supreme Court of Virginia, as it has done with robbery,
will place a different gloss on the construction of the non-capital
offense when it is used to elevate murder to capital murder.
WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE? - POST-CONVICTION REVIEW OF DEATH SENTENCES
By: Juliette A. Falkner
The trial of capital cases should be undertaken with the
knowledge that there are eight further steps possible for judicial
review of a conviction and sentence of death. However, the protec-
tions offered by such extensive review may become virtually
nonexistent if trial attorneys do not keep in mind the law governing
these further proceedings. Likewise, mistakes in representation of
capital defendants at appellate and collateral stages in the state
system may become fatal to further efforts to secure meaningful
review in the federal system. This article is but a primer, designed
only to introduce counsel to some of the issues important at each step
of the post-conviction process.1
DIRECT APPEAL:
In Virginia after the trial court enters a final judgment
sentencing an individual to death, that decision is automatically
appealed to the Supreme Court of Virginia.2 On direct appeal, the
Supreme Court of Virginia must 1) review the assignments of errors,
2) determine if the trier of fact imposed the death sentence in an
arbitrary or capricious manner and 3) decide if the death sentence is
"excessive or disproportionate" compared to the penalty in similar
cases?
The severe and irreversible nature of the death penalty requires
"a greater degree of reliability when it is imposed." However, the
safeguards which promote this greater degree of reliability only apply
during the trial and direct appeal.5 The U.S. Supreme Court has
made this clean ... [Ilt must be remembered that the direct appeal is
the primary avenue of review of a conviction or sentence, and death
penalty cases are no exception.6
Virginia has a contemporaneous objection rule" applicable to
trials and appealss Under this rule an appellate court will not
consider any assignment of error unless:
1. The objection was made with reasonable certainty at the
time of the ruling;9
2. The grounds for the objection were stated at the time of the
ruling.'
0
The purpose of the rule is to allow the trial court the first opportunity
to decide questions of evidence and procedure.'" Objections not made
in conformity with this rule will not be considered, "unless for good
cause shown"12 or "in the interest of justice."13 Good cause includes
no previous opportunity to object.' 4 "In the interest of justice" means
